Anti-traffic analysis attack for location privacy in WSNs by Bi Di Ying et al.
Di Ying et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2014, 2014:131
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/131RESEARCH Open AccessAnti-traffic analysis attack for location privacy in
WSNs
Bi Di Ying1*, Dimitrios Makrakis2 and Hussein T Mouftah2Abstract
Traditional encryption and authentication methods are not effective in preserving a sink's location privacy from a
global adversary that is monitoring the network traffic. In this paper, we first propose a novel anti-traffic analysis
(ATA) method to preserve the sink's location privacy. In order to confuse a local or global adversary, each node generates
dummy messages, the number of which is dependent on the number of the node's children. Hence, ATA is able
to prevent the adversary from acquiring valuable information on the sink's location through the traffic analysis
attack. However, a larger number of dummy messages lead to consumption of extra energy. Then, we design
our improved ATA (IATA) in such a way that we select some sensors to act as fake sinks, to ensure that sensors
around fake sinks generate dummy messages and discard received dummy messages. Since the problem of the
optimal fake sinks' placement is nondeterministic polynomial time (NP)-hard, we employ local search heuristics based on
network traffic and security entropy. Performance analysis of the ATA scheme can protect the sink's location privacy, and
IATA scheme can reduce energy consumption.
Keywords: Sensor network; Traffic analysis attack; Privacy1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are deployed to sup-
port the sensing and communication needs of the
deploying entity. Due to the broadcasting nature of wire-
less communication medium, adversaries can eavesdrop
on network traffic to obtain valuable information. Exist-
ing security technologies cannot always protect the
cyber-security needs of users and the run applications,
in terms of data confidentially and integrity and user
privacy and anonymity. Network traffic analysis can be
used by an adversary to extra important information re-
lated to the node location, functionality, and identity.
Traffic patterns of WSNs can reveal a great deal of con-
textual information, which can disclose the location of
critical nodes. For example, sensing data are transmitted
along relatively fixed paths connecting source nodes to a
sink. This produces quite easily identifiable traffic pat-
terns that reveal a sink's location. In addition, the sens-
ing nodes having one-hop distance from the sink have to
forward a significantly greater volume of packets, since* Correspondence: yingbidi@mail.zjgsu.edu.cn
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in any medium, provided the original work is pthey have to route all the traffic generated by all those
nodes that are farther than nodes having one-hop away
from the sink. An adversary having a global view of
WSN's traffic activity can deduce the location of the sink
by observing and analyzing the traffic volume distribu-
tion within WSN's coverage area for an adequately long
time interval. Discovery of a sink's location may allow
the adversary to launch precise physical and cyber at-
tacks against the sink and thereby disable the network.
Evidently, location privacy is very important, especially
for unattended WSN deployments in harsh or hostile
environments. Recently, a number of location privacy
protection methods have been developed for sensor net-
works, to resist the various types of traffic analysis at-
tacks (e.g., those based on monitoring traffic patterns,
traffic rates, and traffic volumes). Most of them are de-
signed to protect source location privacy against an ad-
versary that is only capable of eavesdropping on a
limited portion of the network at a time [1-4]. However,
the contributions in the current literatures related to a
sink's location privacy are limited [5-7]. These methods
involve multipath routing, fake message injection; how-
ever, those techniques become ineffective in the pres-
ence of a global adversary.an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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bal adversary, we propose an anti-traffic analysis (ATA)
approach to protect the sink's location privacy by artifi-
cially homogenizing traffic intensity. In order to confuse
a local or global adversary, each node generates dummy
messages. The number of dummy messages is dependent
on the number of the node's children (A node ‘X’ whose
messages to the sink have to pass through node ‘Y’ is
considered as ‘child or kid’ of ‘Y’.). This approach is able
to hide the sink's location. Performance analysis shows
that our ATA can protect the sink's location under the
global adversary by launching traffic analysis attacks.
Due to the bandwidth and energy consumed by the
transmission of the dummy messages, the stronger the
protection for the actual sink is, the higher the network
load and energy consumption will be. Therefore, we
then design an improved ATA (IATA) in such a way that
one can easily tune the trade-off between the protection
strength and the overhead. In this IATA, we select some
sensors to act as fake sinks and to imitate the actual
sink's behavior by generating dummy messages. Since
the problem of optimal fake sinks' placement is nonde-
terministic polynomial time (NP)-hard, we employ local
search heuristics that make use of traffic volume and a
sink's location privacy level quantifying parameter to de-
cide the fake sinks' placement positions. Simulation re-
sults show that IATA can reduce energy consumption
while maintaining the sink's location privacy. The contri-
butions in this paper are the following:
(1)The design of a new ATA scheme that protects
sink's location privacy is provided. To do so, ATA
homogenizes artificially the traffic intensity
distribution over the coverage area of the WSN. It
consists of a new topology discovery protocol and a
novel technique that evens out WSN's traffic
volume distribution over its coverage area.
(2)An IATA is proposed to reduce extra energy
induced by dummy messages. This IATA chooses
some sensors instead of all sensors to imitate sink's
behaviors; thus, it can provide a trade-off between
the protection strength and the communication
overhead.
Performance evaluation conducted through computer
simulations confirms the worthiness of the proposed
technology. Our two approaches for protecting the sink's
location privacy have distinct properties that make them
suitable for different applications. The remainder of the
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related
work is surveyed. Section 3 presents goals. Section 4
provides our ATA approach, and then performance ana-
lysis is given. Section 5 further proposes an IATA ap-
proach. Section 6 gives simulation performances of theATA scheme and the IATA scheme. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Privacy has been an active area of research in recent years
[8]. For example, Zhou et al. [9] designed a new multimedia
traffic classification and analysis method for handling the
heterogeneity of diverse applications. Li et al. [10] proposed
an efficient intrusion detection protocol based on energy
prediction in cluster-based WSNs. The aim of this protocol
is to resist denial-of-service attacks due to the broadcast
nature of wireless communication. In location-based ser-
vices, a user may want to protect his/her location and can
try doing so by using various existing techniques, such as
k-anonymity [11-13]. However, those technologies cannot
resist passive traffic analysis attacks where an adversary
monitors packet transmissions to infer locations of crit-
ical - to the infrastructure - elements. Deng et al. in [1]
identified two classes of passive traffic analysis attacks that
can be applied to WSNs, namely, rate monitoring attack
and time correlation attack. In the rate monitoring attack,
an attacker monitors the packet transmission rate of nodes
close to the attacker and moves gradually closer to the
nodes that have a higher packet sending rate, eventually
reaching the sink. In a time correlation attack, an attacker
determines the correlation in frame sending time between
a node and its neighbors. The node that is forwarding the
same frame is expected to transmit it right after or at least
very soon after receiving it. Thus, by identifying the for-
warding nodes of the packet (as it propagates towards the
sink), the attacker can deduce the routing path that leads to
the sink node. It can also reverse the direction it follows
and identify the source as well. Existing literatures against
passive traffic analysis attacks are generally proposed to
protect source nodes' location privacy protection:
(1)Source nodes' location privacy protection
Several schemes dealing with the source nodes'
location privacy can be found in [2,4,14-22]. For
example, Kamat et al. [4] proposed the phantom
flooding protocol transmission of a packet to defend
against an external adversary. It forwards packets
from the source node to the sink using a random-
walk-based approach. Yang et al. [14] used a proxy-
based filtering method. Some sensors are selected as
source proxies to collect and filter dummy messages.
This method reduces the communication cost by
dropping many dummy messages while providing
source event unobservability. Xi et al. [15] proposes
the sink region routing method. In this case, the
source node selects an intermediate node within a
designated area close to the sink node. The area
should be large enough to make it impossible for a
local attacker to monitor the entire region. The
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against the global attacker.
(2)Sink's location privacy protection
A variety of approaches have been used for this purpose,
such as fake message injection, randomization of forward-
ing delay, and use of fake sinks in order to hide the real
sinks' positions [3,5,6,23-33]. For example, Nezhad et al.
[24] proposed an anonymous topology discovery protocol
where all nodes were allowed to forward route discovery
messages and incoming/outgoing labels assigned to nodes.
This method hides the location of a sink. However, a route
discovery message may fail to discover all sensors since
only one copy of this message is forwarded by each node;
in other words, this protocol may lead to some sensors be-
coming isolated or separated from the network. Compared
to [24], in the topology discovery phase of our proposed
ATA scheme, the sink broadcasts a message which re-
quests for establishing a routing tree; thus, our ATA can
avoid some areas which have isolated nodes.
Li et al. [31] proposed an intelligent fake packet injec-
tion scheme based on the random walk. This scheme
provides a balance between the packet delivery latency
and the sink's location privacy. Yao et al. [32] and Chen
et al. [33] studied further the random-walk approach of
[31]. However, Li et al., Yao, and Chen and Lou [31-33]
cannot resist passive traffic analysis attacks under a glo-
bal attacker. Compared to [31-33], our ATA scheme uses
fake messages instead of the random-walk method and
makes each node have the same traffic volume. Thus,
our scheme ATA can resist traffic analysis attacks
launched by a global attacker. Ebrahimi et al. [28]
attempted to protect the sink's location privacy by hav-
ing the sensors located in low-traffic-activity areas to
send fake packets, in order to distract the attention of
the local adversary. Compared to [28], our ATA scheme
does not only make sensors in lower-traffic-activity areas
generate fake messages, but also let nodes close to the sink
generate dummy messages. Thus, our ATA scheme can
prevent traffic analysis attacks under a global attacker.
In [5], dummy sinks are introduced to confuse an ad-
versary from tracking a packet as it moves towards a
sink node. Although the inclusion of dummy sinks can
protect a sensor network from local adversaries, it is not
effective in the case of a global adversary, since global
traffic analysis will allow the identification of all fake and
real sinks, and the adversary can neutralize all of them.
In [26], Mehta et al. proposed to create multiple candi-
date traffic traces going to the established fake sinks in
order to hide the traffic aggregating around real sinks.
Similarly to [5], whenever a fake sink receives a packet
and broadcasts it locally, it will make the attacker believe
that a real sink could be in the range of the fake sink.
This method cannot protect the real sink adequately.Besides, this scheme cannot prevent the time correlation
attack and rate monitoring attack. Compared to [5,26],
our proposed ATA scheme makes each node have the
same traffic volume. Thus, our scheme can hide the sink
location completely.
Bicakci et al. [25] made all nodes including the sink to
equalize the values of their total incoming and outgoing
flows. Data generated by each node is destined not only
to the sink but also to every other node in the network.
This scheme consumes the significant amount of energy
and has quite high needs in terms of processing and
memory. Compared to [25], our ATA performances are
much better; it is scalable and also protects privacy.
The reason for having superior performances will be
understood after the protocol becomes described. Ying
et al. [34] designed a concealing sink location (CSL)
protocol that made a node generate the same traffic
volume with the sink's neighbors by transmitting a
number of fake messages. This feature enables CSL to
prevent the traffic analysis attack launched by a global
adversary. However, the design of CSL protocol is based
on the following assumptions: (i) Sensors are deployed
within a circular area. (ii) The deployment is done ac-
cording to a uniform distribution. (iii) The sink is lo-
cated at the center of the sensor deployment area. Such
conditions are restrictive and do not apply to many
cases of WSN deployments. Compared to [34], our
protocol can remove some of CSL's drawbacks. In this
case, a node generates fake messages according to the
total number of nodes whose routing path to the sink
passes the node (we have named them as ‘kids’ of the
node). This removes the above assumptions from CSL.
Table 1 summarizes the capabilities of the discussed
schemes about the sink's location privacy.
3. Design goals
Protecting the sink's location privacy under the global
attack model is challenging. We can encrypt and authen-
ticate all packets during their forwarding to prevent con-
tent privacy [4]; however, this cannot solve the traffic
analysis attack threat [1,35]. For example, traffic patterns
of WSNs can disclose valuable statistical information
that exposes the location of sink(s), thus jeopardizing
their location privacy. Current literatures describe tech-
niques that employ fake sink(s) [5,26], dummy messages
[25], dummy trajectories [36], random message forward-
ing delay [1], multipath [24] routing, and false distances
between nodes to the sink(s) [37]. However, all existing
methods have one or more of the following problems:
(1) Some of them only can resist traffic analysis attacks
launched by a local attacker, not a global one. (2) Even
those capable of defending against rate monitoring at-
tack lunched by a global attacker cannot prevent the dis-
closure of statistical information that can be explored by
Table 1 Differences among literatures









[3] Local No Yes
[5] Local No No
[6] Local No Yes
[24] Local No No
[25] Local and global No Yes
[26] Local and global No No
[27] Local No No
[28] Local No No
[29] Local No No
[30] Local and global No No
[31] Local No No
[32] Local No No
[33] Local No No
Proposed ATA scheme Local and global Yes Yes
Table 2 Definition of notations
Parameter Meanings
RDM Real data message
FDM Fake data message
H(i) Number of kids node i has
m(i) Number of fake messages generated by node i
ρ The (average) generation rate of RDM messages
per unit of time each node generates
X × Y 2 dimensional deployment area (m)
Real sink Rs
Fake sink Fs
r1 Sensors' communication range
x (i), y (i) Location of a node i or a sink i
N Total number of nodes in the network
TPN1 Largest amount of traffic volume among the traffic
volumes generated by the real sink's neighbors
TPNε+1 Largest amount of traffic volume in the traffic
volumes generated by nodes from (ε + 1) hops
from the real sink
hop (i) Number of hops forming the routing path from
node i to the real sink
hmax Size of the longest routing path from a source to
real sink that is formed over the WSN
Φ(i, j) Number of hops from node i to the fake sink j
Ω(k, j) Number of hops from a sink k to sink j
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ation or traffic volume attack. (3) There is a trade-off be-
tween communication/computation/consumption cost
and offered security/privacy level. Use of dummy traffic
[38] increases significantly the volume of network traffic,
thus increasing the communication, computation, and
energy consumption costs. The goal we set for this work
is to come up with a technology capable of defending
sink(s) location privacy, even when the global attacker
applies all the abovementioned kinds of traffic analysis
attack simultaneously. In our design, we take into con-
sideration the importance of minimizing the network
traffic to allow use of lightweight processing hardware/
software by the sensors and operation under high energy
efficiency.
Without loss of generality and for making the under-
standing of the proposed technique easier to the reader,
we consider that the WSN has a single sink. The traffic
analysis attack model has the following properties: (1)
The attacker is passive, external, and global. This is
realistic [14,22,25,26,30], and previous works investigate
the problem of location privacy under the global and
passive attacker [14,22,25,26,30]. The global attacker is
capable of monitoring all the network traffic by deploying
traffic-monitoring devices (e.g., BlueRadios SMT Module,
BlueRadios, Inc., Englewood, CO, USA) within the area the
WSN cbnh99overs. Note that, at the current price for a
BlueRadios SMT Module at $25, the attacker needs only
$25,000 to build a network of 1,000 nodes [39-41]. What is
more, the number of nodes can typically be smaller than
the number of nodes in the target network as they monitor
wireless radio signals instead of directly sensing the envir-
onment. Thus, for even moderately valuable locationinformation, this can be worth the cost. (2) The attacker
cannot distinguish between actual information carrying
messages and those carrying fake information or other
types of data (e.g., routing-tree formation messages). This
is a valid assumption when all messages are encrypted,
e.g., by using pair-wise secret keys [42].
4. Anti-traffic analysis protocol
For the reader's convenience, we provide in Table 2 the defi-
nitions of notations appearing in the remaining of this work.
4.1. Functionality description of ATA
Execution of ATA includes two main tasks: topology dis-
covery task and data transmission task. The topology
discovery is performed periodically in order to track top-
ology changes occurring due to the energy depletion of
sensor nodes. Data transmission runs after the WSN is
formed and is responsible for the transfer of data
(generated by the sensors) to the sink. These tasks are
described below.
4.1.1. Topology discovery task
Recently, several routing-tree formation protocols for
WSNs were proposed, such as the directed diffusion
protocol [43], probabilistic flooding protocol [44], and
controlled flooding protocol [45]; however, none of them
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subjected to passive traffic analysis attacks. The pro-
posed topology discovery protocol enables the sink to
discover the relative positions (but not necessarily the
geographic coordinates) of all sensors without com-
promising WSN's location privacy if the WSN is under
the surveillance of a global passive attacker.
Topology discovery task is performed periodically and
consists of two sequential phases: Phase1: build each
node's route path. Phase2: determine the number of
each node's children, and inform each node the number
of the children of sink's neighbors.
(1) Phase 1
This phase has a goal to discover (for each sensor node)
a route connecting the node to the sink. This phase re-
quires the formation and transmission of two different
types of messages: route discovery (RDIS) message and
fake RDIS (FRIDS) message. The RDIS message's format is
shown in Figure 1. ‘mtype’ contains the code identifying the
message as of RDIS type. The content of ‘cid’ field identifies
the routing-tree formation refreshing cycle and is the same
for all RDIS messages generated during the same cycle. It
is set by the sink and the sink increases its value by 1 when
it starts a new refreshing cycle. The first value is set to ‘1’.
The ‘sid’ field contains the identifier of the sender node
that is broadcasting this message. The value of ‘ttl’ field in-
dicates the time to live for the particular packet. The value
K set by the sink in the ttl field is integer positive and
should be large enough to allow the broadcasted RDIS
message to reach all nodes, including those located at the
edges of the WSN with a very high probability. The ‘path’
field records identifiers of nodes that this message has
passed through. The first value of path field is the sink's
identifier. In order to deny the attacker to acquire informa-
tion by analyzing the size of transmitted packets, we make
all transmitted messages and data-carrying packets of equal
size. The ‘padding’ field is used to add to the RDIS struc-
ture bytes in order to reach the specific size set for all mes-
sages. The size of mtype field can be as small as 3 bits. The
size of {cid/sid/ttl/path} segment is dependent on the size
of the network how frequently the routing-tree topology is
refreshed, whether truncated or full node ID address is
used; however, assigning a maximum of 4 bytes to eachmtype      cid sid ttl path
mtype: message type (RDIS / FRDIS)
cid: sequence number of routing-refreshing cycle
sid: identifier of the node sending the message
ttl: Time to Live
path: set of identifiers of nodes that the message visited 
padding:  is variable in message size
padding
Figure 1 RDIS/FRDIS message format.of those fields is deemed sufficient for WSN' s applica-
tions [46].
After sensors are deployed in the area, formation of the
routing tree (to the sink) is required. The process is trig-
gered by the sink and is done so by broadcasting the first
RDIS message. Any intermediate node receiving the RDIS
message of the present cycle for the first time records infor-
mation included in the RDIS message and rebroadcasts it
after making the following modifications: it places its own
identifier in the sid, decreases the value of the ttl field by 1,
records the values of path field, and adds its own identifier
in the path field. Any RDIS messages of the same cycle
received by the node are dropped. This policy ensures that
in each topology discovery execution, every node records
the first RDIS message it receives and generates only one
RDIS of its own during the current topology discovery
task.
Right after WSN's deployment, there is a concern that if
the sink is the first one to generate transmission, there is a
small chance to compromise its position. This is possible if
the attacker has location identification capability. To elim-
inate even this possibility, each sensor performs the follow-
ing process: each sensor decides with a pre-set probability
μ to generate FRDIS message (FRDIS message format is
shown in Figure 1). If a receiving node receives the FRDIS
for the first time, it records the value of cid, modifies sid
and ttl by following the same method used for RDIS mes-
sages, and rebroadcasts it. All subsequently received copies
of the FRDIS message are dropped by the node.
(2) Phase 2
The objective of this phase is to make each node aware
of how many nodes will be using it as a relay when they
are sending messages to the sink. This is done as follows.
Each node generates and sends an ‘I am your kid’
(IAYK) message towards the sink, which is routed on
the established route path connecting the node to the
sink. IAYK's structure is shown in Figure 2. The value of
cid field identifies the route-update cycle. All IAYK mes-
sages generated and transmitted during a certain top-
ology discovery cycle contains the same cid value. The
‘gid’ field contains the identifier of the node that gener-
ates the specific IAYK message.mtype      
mtype: message type (IAYK)
cid: sequence number of route-update cycle
gid: identifier of the node generating the message
did: identifier of the node receiving the message
ttl: Time to Live
padding:is variable in message size
cid      gid did ttl padding
Figure 2 IAYK message format.
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has by calculating the number of IAYK-type messages it
receives, each having different gid field values from the
others. Each node, when receiving the IAYK message
for the first time, records the next hop node's identi-
fier (as determined by the routing path) into the ‘did’
field, decreases the value of the ttl field by 1, and
transmits the modified IAYK message. The size of gid and
did is depending on the network size; however, size of 4
bytes is sufficient for most WSNs [46].
After each IAYK message reaching the sink, the sink's
neighbors generate a total kids (TK) message, whose for-
mat is shown in Figure 3, and transmit this message.
The gid field indicates the identifier of the node generat-
ing the TK message; the ‘kid’ field contains the total
number of this node's kids. Upon receiving this message,
each node checks if the node identifier value recorded in
gid field is in its route path or not. If it is, the receiving
node records the value contained in the kid field, de-
creases the value of the ttl field by 1, and then transmits
the message. If the node receives TK more than once, it
ignores and discards all the follow-up receptions. The
length of the kid field depends on the network size. A
size of 4 bytes is considered sufficient for most WSN de-
ployment [46].4.1.2. Data transmission task
By the completion of the routing-tree formation task, a
packet routing topology that has a tree-like structure
with the sink being its root, has been generated. As ex-
plained earlier, the closer a node is to the sink (in terms
of the number of hops), the larger the number of mes-
sages it has to transmit becomes, since it tends to be the
traffic forwarder (to the sink) of a larger number of sen-
sor nodes. The traffic-monitoring attacker can easily
identify this trend of traffic volumes and from that de-
duce a well-confined region within which the sink is ex-
pected to be located. In order to solve this problem, we
introduce a mechanism that has an objective to have all
nodes generate equal volume of traffic. This prevents themtype      
mtype: message type (TK)
cid: sequence number of route-update cycle
gid: identifier of the node generating the message
kid: number of the node (gid)’s children
ttl: Time to Live
padding:  is variable in message size
cid      gid kid ttl padding
Figure 3 TK message format.global attacker from being able to acquire valuable stat-
istical knowledge through traffic analysis.
To achieve this, a node generates two different types of
messages: real data message (RDM) and fake data message
(FDM). RDMs carry useful information collected by sen-
sors and destined for the sink, while FDMs are generated
for confusing the attacker.
Figure 4 provides the structure of RDM and FDM
packets. The mtype field contains the code identifying
this packet as a ‘data’ carrying message. For RDM or
FDM packets, mtype = DATA. sid and did fields contain
the identifiers of the sender and its one-hop forwarder
node on the sender's routing path to the sink. The ttl
field contains the time to live of the particular packet.
As the packet passes through a node, its value is decre-
mented by one. When ttl = 0, the node drops the packet.
The source node sets a value of ttl equal to the num-
ber of hops to the sink of its route path. The source
node sets ttl = 0 for FDM packets. ‘pkseq’ contains the
sequence number that uniquely identifies the specific
packet from any other packets sent by the specific
source to the sink. Size of 4 bytes is sufficient for the
pkseq field [46]. The ‘data’ field contains the actual data
payload if the packet is RDM or a meaningless pattern if it
is FDM.
After receiving a packet, node i decrypts it and moves
its payload content upwards. If it is a DATA-type mes-
sage, this node checks ttl to find out if it should be for-
warded or dropped. If ttl > 0, the node places its own
identifier in sid and its one-hop forwarder node's identi-
fier in did, and decreases the value of ttl by 1. In order
to prevent traffic analysis attack, the receiving node does
not forward the RDM immediately. It places this RDM
in a buffer containing forwarded RDMs (includes RDMs
generated by the node itself and those for which it acts
as a relay). In the mean time, this node has to generate
an average of m(i) FDMs (in reference to the unit of
time). That brings the total average traffic of node i to
m(i) + gi + f(i), where gi is the average number of RDMs
generated by node i and f(i) is the average number ofmtype      
mtype: message type (DATA)
sid: identifier of the node sending the message
did: identifier of the node receiving the message
ttl:Time to Live
pkseq: sequence of data message
data: data payload
sid did ttl pkseq data
Figure 4 Format of RDM and FDM.
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represents the number of children node i has, and node
j belongs to the set I1 − hop, which contains all children
of node i, one-hop away from it.
To increase the statistical uncertainty for the attacker,
the node can randomize (in accordance to certain distri-
bution or distributions) the inter-departure times of
RDM and FDM packets. Running a random generator,
the node i selects the message at the head of the RDM
queue with probability pRDM ið Þ ¼ giþf ið Þgiþf ið Þþm ið Þ . If sending
of the RDM message is not selected, it generates and
transmits a FDM message. If the RDM is selected but
the RDM queue is empty, it transmits nothing.
4.2. Energy consumption
Energy consumption for communication is very important
for sensors due to limited resources in sensors. Energy
consumption for packet transporting in the WSN is in pro-
portion to the distance. The distance to neighbors can in-
crease or decrease the energy consumption of radio
channel to transmit a data bit. Besides, the factors like the
number of packets and the size of packets are also import-
ant in determining the amount of energy consumption of
sensors. Therefore, we use a radio energy consumption
model [47] which derived the energy consumption of
transmit and receive, an L-bit message from different sen-
sors. In this model, during radio operation transmit and re-
ceive, circuitry dissipates (each) Eelec =50 nJ/bit and the
transmit amplifier Eamp =100 pJ/bit/m
2. Thus, to transmit
an L-bit-long message to a receiving node located at dis-
tance d from the transmitter, we have the following
amount of energy consumption:
ETx L; dð Þ ¼ Eelec  Lþ Eamp  L d2 ð1Þ
The energy consumed to receive this message equals
ERx L; dð Þ ¼ Eelec  L ð2Þ
We represent with S1 − hop the set containing as mem-
bers all nodes having one-hop distance from the sink
and LDATA the size of RDMs and FDMs (in bits). The
energy consumption occurring during the data transmis-
sion phase is




gk þ f kð Þ
 2 ð3Þ
In phase 1, each node that receives an RDIS or
FRDIS message for the first time should re-broadcast
this (RDIS or FRDIS) message. We define as LRDIS (bits)
the size of the RDIS and FRDIS messages. We assume theprobability of the selected source nodes to initiate trans-
mission of FRDIS messages is μ; thus,







 N þ Nμð Þ ð4Þ
where Swhole is the size of the deployment area, r1 is the
communication radius of each sensor, and N is the total
number of sensors deployed into the area.
In phase 2, each node sends an IAYK message accord-
ing to the route table. Representing by LIAYK (bits) the
size of the IAYK message, we have the following:




H jð Þ þ 1½  ð5Þ
Each one-hop node of the sink generates a TK message
with the size of LTK bits; thus,







 N−1ð Þ ð6Þ
Therefore, cos tTopo1, cos tTopo2, and cos tTopo3 are oc-
curring during the topology discovery, which is performed
infrequently; thus, energy consumption cos t ≅ cos tData.
4.3. Performance simulation analysis
We evaluated the performance of our approach, the con-
ventional scheme, and the CSL scheme [34] through
simulation using OPNET [48]. Note that by the term
‘conventional scheme’ we mean a WSN that is not trans-
mitting FDMs; thus, it is highly vulnerable to traffic
analysis attacks. All simulation parameters are listed in
Table 3. We performed 100 simulation runs with differ-
ent seeds and calculated average values.
4.3.1. Energy consumption and network life
Figure 5 shows how the total energy consumed by sensors
is impacted by the simulation time (there is no dead node
during the simulation time). The CSL scheme has the
highest energy consumption compared to ATA scheme
and conventional scheme.
As shown in Figure 5, the conventional scheme has
lower energy consumption. It is thus self-evident that the
average node lifetime of conventional WSN deployments
will be longer compared to ATA scheme. However, nodes
at one-hop distance from the sink have to act as traffic for-
warders of nodes that are not in the sink's hearing distance;
thus, they end up dying considerably earlier compared to
the rest of the nodes. When all one-hop nodes die, WSN is
dead as well despite the fact many nodes remaining alive,
since the collected information cannot be passed to the
Table 3 Simulation configurations
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 50
Deployment area 250 m × 250 m
Channel bandwidth (kHz) 22.000
Channel data rate 11 Mbps
Short retry limit in MAC layer 7
Long retry limit in MAC layer 4
Wireless protocol IEEE 802.11
MAC layer buffer size (in bits) 256,000
Data payload (in bytes) 1,024
Packet generation at start time (s.) 5.0
Inter arrival time of packet (s.) Constant (1.0)







































Figure 6 Average life of LtoDSN.
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http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/131sink. A better assessment of WSN's life duration is to look
at the times the sink's neighbor dies (in which case infor-
mation routed through that node does not reach the sink
and becomes lost). In the following results, the initial
energy stored in each node is 1.5 J; the simulation ends up
until all nodes are dead. We start presenting results for the
time it takes to have the last ‘dead’ neighbor of the sink (to
be referred as last-to-die-sink-neighbor (LtoDSN)) for the
conventional scheme, ATA scheme, and CSL scheme. They
are shown in Figure 6. X axis corresponds to the time
interval between the starting times of two successive top-
ology discovery cycles. We see a gradual increase of the
LtoDSN life duration as the frequency of refreshing the
topology discovery is increased. For ATA and CSL, this
change is modest whereas for the conventional scheme is
quite significant. This dependency is due to the followingFigure 5 Total energy consumption.reason. In-between two consecutive topology discovery re-
freshing events, some nodes with distance longer than
one-hop from the sink become drained and die. Packets
sent by nodes whose routing path to the sink passes
through such node will be terminated and will not reach
the sink's neighbor; thus, the sink's neighbors have the
lower traffic volume to forward to the sink, resulting in
conservation of energy. However, when a new cycle for the
topology discovery is running, new routing paths will be
formed, enabling again those nodes that have been cut off
from the sink to reconnect, placing again the one-hop from
sink nodes at a position of having to forward a higher traf-
fic volume of packets, thus draining themselves faster.
Figure 7 shows the progression of node depletion ver-
sus time. We define ‘active node’ that this node is alive
itself and its parents still are alive. We do not refresh the
routing tree in the simulation. Compared to CSL, ATA
loses its first node approximately 27 s later than the CSL

































Figure 7 Total number of active nodes.
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http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/131active nodes are in range of 49 to 10. This advantage
comes with the very important additional benefit of having
a secure scheme (ATA) capable of neutralizing the danger
of traffic volume monitoring attack. Compared to the con-
ventional scheme, the time duration when using ATA or
CSL has close values, and in any case, the closeness be-
tween the two curves remains close for the whole range of
time display. That means fake messages in ATA scheme
have no huge influence on the average life of active node.
A way to understand the coverage ability WSN has
and how it changes in time is to determine the number
of packets the sink receives within a set time window, as
it moves in time. Figure 8 is doing just that for three
schemes using a window of 8 s. The values shown at
16 s indicate the number of RDM packets the sink re-
ceived within the time interval [(16-8) = 8 s; 16 s], and
goes on. The conclusions are the following: the CSL
scheme has lowest RDM delivery up until 64 s, and
afterwards, the trend reverses. The gap of RDM delivery
between ATA and conventional scheme is very small,
especially after 64 s.
4.3.2. Security
An area with a dimension of 240 m × 240 m is assigned
as the area monitored by the global attacker. A grid is
formed within this area, segmenting it into smaller
squares of 20-m length each. Traffic-monitoring devices
(passing the information to the attacker) are placed at
the locations [x = 20 m × j; y = 20 m × k] where 1 ≤ j ≤ 12,
1 ≤ k ≤ 12. The sink is at location [x= 120.0 m; y = 120.0 m].
The simulation time is 1,000 s, the topology discovery is
performed at the beginning and remains unchanged, and
enough energy is stored in each node to remain alive for
the duration of the simulation. Let Pi be the average traffic
volume measured by the monitoring device i divided by





































Figure 8 Average number of received RDMs.by all monitoring devices. An attacker is trying to identify
the location (or at least the region) where the largest vol-
ume of traffic volume is occurring and will conclude the
sink should be located within that area. In an approximate
sense, it can be associated with the probability that the
sink is located within the area the monitoring device i
operates and can provide a measure for the degree of
certainty of this been the case.
Figure 9a, b, c provides the values of Pi at different loca-
tions of the monitored area for the conventional scheme,
ATA scheme, and CSL scheme. X axis and Y axis define
the plane on which sensor nodes and traffic-monitoring
devices are deployed. The perpendicular - to X and Y -
plane axis displays the value of Pi. It is evident that in
the case of the conventional system, Pi peaks at the
sink's location. Also, the strength increases (almost)
consistently, as we move from the boundaries of the
monitored area, where the sink is located. On the con-
trary, in the case of ATA, the distribution of Pi appears
to be close to uniform, not allowing the attacker to de-
velop confidence in terms of the sink's location. In the
case of CSL, Pi's distribution is considerably less spread
out compared to the ATA scheme, thus reducing signifi-
cantly uncertainty.5. Preserving sink's location: an improved ATA
scheme
There is a trade-off between information delivery perfor-
mances, energy efficiency, and location privacy by using
dummy traffic to hide the real sink's location. If all
packets are real event packets, the communication/com-
putation cost will be lower; however, it will be very easy
for a global attacker to trace the packets. If we make all
nodes having the traffic volume using dummy traffic, it
will significantly increase the network. Our goal is to
minimize the network traffic while to guarantee the real
sink (RS)'s location privacy.
To address this problem, we propose an improved ATA
(IATA) scheme. In this IATA, we select several nodes to act
as ‘fake sinks’ (FS) and emulate traffic patterns similar to
the RS, in order to confuse the global attacker. We take
into account the case that nodes deployed into an area
X × Y according to a grid network. We define as ‘Mixnode’
each node that satisfies the following conditions: (i) it is
located within any circle having as center a FS or the RS
and radius r1 × ɛ, where r1 is the sensor's communication
range and ɛ is a positive integer; (ii) it produces traffic vol-
ume equal to TPN1 (TPN1 is the largest amount of traffic
volume among the traffic volumes generated by the real
sink's neighbors). We define as UnMixnode each node
that: (i) it is not located within any circle having as center
a FS or the RS and radius r1 × ɛ; (ii) it produces traffic vol-































































Figure 9 Conventional scheme (a), ATA scheme (b), CSL scheme (c).
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nodes from (ɛ + 1) hops from the real sink).
5.1. Fake sink's placement
Deploying fake sinks at the right locations is crucial to
the network's performance in terms of RDM end-to-end
delay, RDM delivery ratio, and sink's location privacy.
For example, if all fake sinks are the real sink's neighbors
as well, or they are deployed close to each other, or the
radius r1 × ɛ is small, the scheme would not work and
the global attacker will be able to determine the sink's
location. This is because it has the fewer number of
nodes which generate fake messages when the value of
r1 × ɛ is small, and the attacker can guess the sink's loca-
tion with a high probability under having a knowledge of
the area where the real sink is. If the circle having center
RS and radius r1 × ɛ is large enough to cover the whole
sensor deployment area, it has the largest traffic volume of
the network since all nodes located in the circle produce
traffic volume equal to TPN1. Since heavy traffic volume
increases RDM end-to-end delay and RDM delivery ratio,
our objective is to minimize the network's traffic along
with maintaining the real sink's location privacy. The
optimization criterion used in the selection of the FS
locations is formed to materialize the abovementioned
objective.We express with Nin the number of Mixnodes and
with N the total number of nodes in the network. The
total traffic volume of the network, TV, can be
TV ¼ NinTPN1 þ N−Ninð ÞTPNεþ1 ð7Þ
The goal of the attacker is to identify a set CTV of de-
vices that represent the set of possible locations (or re-
gions) of the sink. Hence, the goal of the attacker is to
discover the sink's location (or region). This set indicates
that the attacker believes that the objects being observed
are close to some of the devices in CTV. Since Mixnodes
have the same (and maximum) traffic volume, thus, by
observing the traffic volume, the attacker cannot distin-
guish if a Mixnode is a sink or not. Assume that the
total number of these regions is Nrn, then the probability
of any region member of CTV including the location of
the real sink is 1/Nrn, which reflects the level of uncer-
tainty the attacker has in terms of identifying correctly a
region of the sink. We define and use as a privacy meas-











Define Ω(k, j) be the number of hops from the fake
sink k to the fake sink j and hmax be the maximum
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http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/131number of hops between all nodes and the real sink. ε
should be satisfied: (i) To avoid the case without any
fake sink, ε should be less than (equal to) hmax/2. (ii) To
make sure that there has been no overlapped area
among the circles with center FS or RS and radius r1 × ɛ,
Ω(k, j) should be larger than (equal to) 2 ε, where 0 < k,
j ≤Nrn − 1. (iii) To make sure FSs should be located in
this deployment area, we have to satisfy this condition
of min (X − x(j), x(j),Y − y(j), y(j))/r1 ≥ ɛ, where (x(j), y
(j)) is the sink j's position. Our goal is to provide a
method that enables to minimize traffic volume while to
maintain the location privacy larger than (equal to) a
threshold δ. Therefore, we use a metric of




min X−x jð Þ; x jð Þ;Y−y jð Þ; y jð Þð Þ=r1≥ε





0 < k; j≤Nrn−1
8>>><
>>>:
From Equation 9, the total number of fake sinks and
their fake sinks' positions depends on the values of ent
and TV, conditions of min (X − x(j), x(j),Y − y(j), y(j))/r1 ≥
ɛ, and Ω k;jð Þ2 ≤ε≤
hmax




2 is linked with the fake sinks' positions, and the total
traffic volume of the network depends on the number of
fake sinks directly. Thus, the fake sink's placement prob-
lem is NP-hard.
Theorem 1: The fake sinks' placement problem is
NP-hard.
Proof: we prove the NP-hardness of the fake sinks'
placement problem by reducing the well-know knapsack
problem defined as follows:
The knapsack problem [49]: Given a set of items z1,
z2,…, zn, each item zi with a weight wi and a value vi, the
maximum weight that we can carry in the bag is W.








We create a fake sink i as an item zi, and traffic vol-
ume generated by Mixnodes located in the range of the
fake sink i as a vi. The total entropy should not be less
than δ. Position changes of fake sinks may cause recal-
culations for traffic volume, numbers of fake sinks, and
so on. Thus, we have to minimize the total traffic vol-
ume given the condition of the entropy that is ≥ δ. It is
easy to see that the fake sinks' placement problem is in
NP class as the objective function associated with a
given solution can be evaluated in a polynomial time.
Thus, we conclude that this fake sinks' placement problemis NP-hard [14]. We give the following algorithm of placing
fake sinks, where hop(i) is the number of hops forming the
routing path from node i to the real sink, Φ(i, j) is the num-
ber of hops from node i to the fake sink j, node i' s position
is (x(i), y(i)). Lines 4 to 11 try to find the first fake sink
which satisfies the condition of hop(i) ≥ d and min (X − x
(i), x(i),Y − y(i), y(i))/r1 ≥ ɛ. Lines 12 to 27 try to find theother fake sinks in the deployment area. Line 28 com-
putes the multiobjective optimization value. Line 31 gives
the best placements of fake sinks.
Figure 10 gives an example of optimal fake sinks' place-
ment. Two hundred fifty-six nodes are uniformly deployed
into an area with 500 m× 500 m, and a real sink is located
at position (250 m, 250 m). The communication range is
30 m. We can see that there are four fake sinks whose po-
sitions are approximately (105 m, 105 m), (345 m, 405 m),
(105 m, 375 m), and (375 m, 105 m).5.2. Details of IATA scheme
The IATA protocol includes two phases: topology discov-
ery phase and data transmission phase. In the topology
discovery phase, a routing path of each node which con-
nects the node to the sink is setup by the ATA method.
After the topology discovery phase, a topology map has
been generated which has a tree-like structure with the
sink being the root. Besides, each node knows the route
path, the number of its children, the total number of


































Figure 12 Total number of active nodes in three schemes.






















































Figure 10 Optimal fake sinks' placement.
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and ɛ. In addition, each node can check if it is Mixnode or
UnMixnode by knowing the fake sinks' positions and ɛ.
The process of transmitting data messages is as follows.
(1)If one Mixnode MNi receives RDMs and FDMs,
it will forward RDMs (including RDMs
generated by itself and forwarded RDMs)
according to the route, and discard FDMs. In order
to prevent the attacker from drawing conclusions by
identifying and tracing successive transmissions,
which might eventually lead the attacker to
the sink, the Mixnode does not forward the RDMs
immediately. It places RDM in a buffer
containing nonprocessed yet RDM (includes RDM
generated by the node itself and those for which it
acts as a relay).
(2)Then, the Mixnode MNi generates m(MNi)
FDMs and sends them according to the route
path. Let H(MN(i)) represent the number of kids
Mixnode MNi has; we have m MNið Þ ¼ TPN1−
gMNi−f MNið Þ, where gMNi is an average number
of RDMs generated by Mixnode MNi, f(MNi) is
an average number of RDMs forwarded by
Mixnode MNi, f MNið Þ ¼
XH MN ið Þð Þ
node j∈MNI1−hop
gj, and
node j belongs to a set MNI1 − hop of children
of Mixnode.
(3)If one UnMixnode UMNi receives RDM and
FDM, it will forward RDMs (including RDM
generated by himself and forwarded RDM)
according to the route, and discard FDMs. Then,
UMNi generates m(UMNi) FDMs and sendsthem according to the route path. Note that m
UMNið Þ ¼ TPNεþ1−gUMNi−f UMNið Þ, where gUMNi
is an average number of RDMs generated by
UnMixnode UMNi, f(UMNi) is an average number of
RDMs forwarded by UnMixnode UMNi, H(UMN(i))
represent the number of kids UnMixnode UMNi has
f UMNið Þ ¼
XH UMN ið Þð Þ
node j∈UMNI1−hop
gj, and node j belongs to a
set UMNI1 − hop of children of UnMixnode UMNi.6. Performance evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our ATA, IATA, and the
conventional scheme, through simulation using OPNET.
The reported results correspond to Table 3, with one sink
and 256 nodes which are deployed into vertexes into a
grid of 30-m length each, and the radius of each node is
30 m.






































Figure 13 Fraction of RDMs received by the real sink.
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http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/131Figure 11 illustrates the behavior of the average RDM
delivery time (average end-to-end delay) as the size of
data packet generated at the application layer. Each node
generates a data packet per interval time 1.0 s. Enough en-
ergy has been provided to all nodes, to ensure all of them
remain alive for the duration of the simulation. We can see
that the delivery delay is increasing with the size of a data
packet in IATA and conventional scheme. On the contrary,
delivery delay in the ATA scheme increases until the size of











































Figure 14 Conventional scheme (a), IATA (b), ATA (c).reason for this is that when the size of a data packet is lar-
ger than 400 bytes, ATA has a higher packet loss in the
MAC layer, which leads to those successful delivery packets
reducing waiting time in the MAC layer buffer. Compared
to ATA, IATA has a significantly better performance that
keeps the values of average end-to-end delay 0.08 s.
Figure 12 shows the progression of node depletion ver-
sus time. Initial energy stored in each node is 0.5 J; the
simulation ends up until all nodes are dead. Each sensor
node generates a data packet of size 100 bytes at its ap-
plication layer every second. Curves in all the three
schemes are very close, and the total number of active
nodes decreases sharply during a period [35 s 42 s]. That
means fake messages in ATA scheme and IATA scheme
have no any influence on the average life of active node.
Figure 13 displays the fraction of RDMs received by
the real sink. There is no dead node during the simula-
tion time of 1,000.0 s. The delivery ratio in IATA and
the conventional scheme keeps at least 0.95, while in
ATA scheme, the fraction of RDMs received by the real
sink decreases sharply after the size of data packet 400
bytes. The main reason is that ATA generates too many
fake messages, which leads to poor performances such
as delivery delay and delivery ratio.
An area with dimensions 500 m × 500 m is assigned as
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of 30-m length each. Traffic-monitoring devices (passing
the information to the attacker) are placed at the centers
of grids. Figure 14 displays the values of Pi at different
locations of the monitored area. Figure 14a, b, c provides
results for the conventional scheme, IATA scheme, and
ATA scheme. X axis and Y axis define the plane on
which sensor nodes and traffic-monitoring devices are
deployed. The perpendicular - to X and Y - plane axis
displays the value of Pi. It is evident that in the case of
the conventional system, Pi peaks at the sink's location.
On the contrary, in the case of IATA, the distribution of
Pi appears to uniform within five different regions,
which will enhance significantly uncertainty. In the case
of ATA, the highest values of Pi in the region of
250 m × 250 m are distributed uniformly.
7. Conclusions
Sink is the connecting point of the sensor network with
the entity making use of its collected results; thus, the abil-
ity of the sink to be capable to receive collected informa-
tion is very crucial. In this paper, after analyzing the sink's
location privacy problem, we firstly describe and analyze a
new ATA scheme aiming at concealing the sink's location
by using fake message injection. Then, we design an im-
proved ATA (IATA) scheme where some nodes are se-
lected to act the fake sinks, and sensors around fake sinks
generate dummy messages and discard received dummy
messages. Performance analysis of the ATA scheme can
protect the sink's location privacy, and the IATA scheme
can reduce traffic volume.
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